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【预订】Strategic Bargaining and Cooperation in Greenhous
  • 市场价格:213
  • 促销价格:213
  • 商品编码:42514006506
  • 商品分类:bargaining
  • 商品所在地:北京
  • 商品来源:天猫
  • 发布时间:2017-06-04 13:03:06
商品详细信息 -

【预订】Strategic Bargaining and Cooperation in Greenhous



Product Details 基本信息
ISBN-13 书号 9780262526258
Author 作者 Yang, Zili
Pages Number 页数 202页
Publisher 出版社 MIT Press (MA)
Publication Date 出版日期 2008年10月31日
Product Dimensions 商品尺寸 22.9 x 15.2 x 0.0 cm
Shipping Weight 商品重量 276
Language 语种 英文
Book Description 内容简介

The impact of climate change is widespread, affecting rich and poor countries and economies both large and small. Similarly, the study of climate change spans many disciplines, in both natural and social sciences. In environmental economics, leading methodologies include integrated assessment (IA) and game theoretic modeling, which, despite their common premises, seldom intersect. In Strategic Bargaining and Cooperation in Greenhouse Gas Mitigations, Zili Yang connects these two important approaches by incorporating various game theoretic solution concepts into a well-known integrated assessment model of climate change. This framework allows a more comprehensive analysis of cooperation and strategic interaction that can inform policy choices in greenhouse gas (GHG) mitigation. Yang draws on a wide range of findings from IA and game theory to offer an analysis that is accessible to scholars in both fields. Yang constructs a cooperative game of stock externality provision--the economic abstraction of climate change--within the IA framework of the influential RICE model (developed by William D. Nordhaus and Zili Yang in 1996). The game connects the solution of an optimal control problem of stock externality provision with the bargaining of GHG mitigation quotas among the regions in the RICE model. Yang then compares the results of both game theoretic and conventional solutions of the RICE model from incentive and strategic perspectives and, through numerical analysis of the simulation results, demonstrates the superiority of game theoretic solutions. Yang also applies the game theoretic solutions of RICE to such policy-related concerns as unexpected shocks in economic/climate systems and redistribution and transfer issues in GHG mitigation policies. Yang's innovative approach sheds new light on the behavioral aspects of IA modeling and provides game theoretic modeling of climate change with a richer economic substance.



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